Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on the development of relations between the European Union and Vietnam. Session Documents 1994, Document A3-0110/94, 23 February 1994 by Guermeur, Guy
I 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
s e s s i o 11 d o c u 111 e n t s 
ENGLISH EDITION 
23 February 1994 A3-0110/94 
REPORT 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
on the development of relations between the European Union 
and Vietnam 




"I Cooperation procedure (first readmg) 
simple majority 
"11 CooperatiOn procedure (second reading) 
si~le maJOrrty to approve the common posrt1on 
absolute maJOrrty of Parhamenl's component Members lo reject or amend the common posrt1on 
Assent procedure 
absolute maJOrity of Parhamenl's componenl Members to giVe assent 
excepl for simple majorrty under ArtiCles Sa, 105, 1 06, 130d and 228 EC 
'''I COICieCISIOn procedure (first readmg) 
Simple maJOrity 
PE 206.913/fin. 
fr - Or. fr 
'"11 COICieciSIOn procedUie (second reading) 
s1~le maJOrrty to approve the common posrt10n 
absolute maJOrrty of Parliamenl's component Members erther to adopt a declaration of intent 
to reject the common posrt10n, or lo amend or confirm the reJeCtiOn of the common posrtion 
'"Ill CodeciSion procewre ~h1rd reading) 
Simple maJorrty to approve the JOint text 
absolule majority of Parliament's component Members to reject the Council text 
DA DE EL ES FR IT NL PT 

Procedural page . . . . . . . 
A. 
B. 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT . 
CONTENTS 
Aon8X I: Motion for resolution 83-0265/90 







At the sitting .of 2 ·April 1990 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr Tsimas on 
relations between the European Community and Vietnam, pursuant to former Rule 
63/new Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and Security as the committee responsible and to the Committee on Development 
and Cooperation for its opinion. 
At its meeting of 21 May 1990 the committee decided to draw up a report and, on 
29 June 1990, appointed Mrs Alliot-Marie rapporteur. Following the latter's 
resignation, Mr Guermeur was appointed rapporteur at the meeting of 20 July 
1993. 
At its meetings of 26 January 1994 and 22 February 1994 the committee considered 
the draft report. 
At· the last meeting it adopted the resolution by 21 votes to 2, with 
abstention. 
The following took part in the vote: Baron Crespo, chairman; Catherwood, 2nd 
vice-chairman; Crampton, 3rd vice-chairman; Guermeur, rapporteur; Avgerinos, 
Bertens, Cheysson, Delorozoy, Fernandez Albor, Ford (for Balfe), Giinther, 
Habsburg, Lagakos (for Bonetti), Langer, Lenz, Llorca Vilaplana, Lamas (for 
Dury), Newens, Onesta, Panders, Pesmazoglou, Poettering, Puerta and Sakellariou. 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation decided on 8 January 1993 not to 
deliver an opinion. 
The report was tabled on 23 February 1994. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
DOC_EN\RR\247\247175 - 3 - PE 206.913/fin. 
A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
Resolution on the development of relations between 
the European Union and Vietnam 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr TSIMAS on relations 
between the European CQmmunity and Vietnam (83~0265/90), 
having regard to its resolution of 12 September 1991 on the situation in 
South-East Asia1 , 
having regard to its resolution of 12 June 1992 on economic and trade 
relations between the European Community and Indo-China2, 
- having regard to its resolution of 29 October 1993 on the European Community's 
economic and trade relations with Vietnam3 , 
- having regard to its resolution of 19 November 1993 on the participation of 
the European Community in the international programme for the reintegration 
of Vietnamese returnees4 , 
- having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
(A3-0110/94), 
A. whereas Vietnam plays an essential role in the Indo-China peninsula and 
South-East Asia in general as a result of its history and the size and 
economic dynamism of its population, 
B. having regard to the role of history in shaping the present situation of 
Vietnam and, in particular, to the influence which the Chinese threat has 
had for centuries on the political life of the nation, 
c. whereas this threat is still very much alive in the minds of the Vietnamese 
people and continues to have a certain influence on Vietnam's diplomatic 
policies, 
D. acknowledging also that the industrialized countries of Asia, America and 
Europe in various ways bear a share of the responsibility for the sufferings 
of the Vietnamese people, 
OJ No. c 267, 14, 1 0, 1991 1 P • 9 
2 OJ No. c 176, 13, 7 o 19921 P • 228 
3 See minutes of the sitting on that date 
4 See minutes of the sitting on that date 
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E. having particular regard to the strong legacy of feeling about the United 
States left in the collective consciousness of the Vietnamese people by the 
war, 
F. whereas Vietnam has fought hard for its independence since 1945; whereas, 
however, there has been no substantial progress towards democracy during 
this period, 
G. whereas, following the Paris agreements on Cambodia, Vietnam has turned its 
attention back to itself and its main concern now appears to be to modernize 
its economic system by introducing market economy mechanisms and integrating 
into the global economy, 
H. whereas the European Union, to which Vietnam and other countries in that 
region are linked through cultural and historic ties, can help Vietnam to 
attain these two objectives; whereas the cooperation agreement which is due 
to be negotiated between the two parties shortly is specifically geared to 
this purpose, 
I. welcoming the positive developments throughout the region since the 
restoration of peace in Cambodia; having regard in particular to the 
increased trade between the countries of South-East Asia and the economic 
liberali%ation measures in southern China, 
J. welcoming the fact that the total embargo on economic relations with 
Vietnam, initiated by the United States, has now been largely lifted, 
K. welcoming the agreement in principle that has now been reached between 
Vietnam and the International Monetary Fund and the process of resuming 
economic contacts with European Union Member States and undertakings, 
L. whereas Vietnam is in a period of transition towards a market economy and 
is still far from undertaking the political reforms needed to create a 
climate for democracy, even if some - as yet only hesitant - progress can 
be discerned in this area, 
M. aware at the same time that the transition towards a market economy 
inevitably brings with it social tensions which Vietnam must bring under 
control in order to avoid any nostalgic tendency which might pose a threat 
to what has been ac~ieved so far, including the hesitant steps made towards 
democracy and religious toleration, · 
N. whereas all of this must be taken into account in the development of 
relations between the European Union and Vietnam, 
0. whereas one of the main objectives of the common foreign and security policy 
( CFSP) enshrined in the Treaty on European Union is 'to develop and 
consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedom~'; whereas any significant progress in this sphere by 
Vietnam would help to foster the development of relations with the European 
Union, 
P. whereas, in this connection, certain administrative acts by the Vietnamese 
authorities constitute a threat to fundamental freedoms, run counter to the 
principles enshrined in the cooperation agreements with the European Union 
and weaken Vietnam's international position as a consequence, 
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Q. whereas the Asian seaboard of the Pacific is in danger of being dominated 
by one or more large countries; whereas it is in Vietnam's interests to open 
up to other partners which may act as a counterweight to such power, 
R. having regard to Vietnam's geostrategic importance in that it is a country 
situated near one of the busiest shipping routes in the world, 
S. whereas, given the large regional economic groupings (NAFTA and APEC) which 
are emerging, it is clearly in the European Union's interests to have some 
influence in this region, 
T. whereas Vietnam could provide precisely such a foothold; whereas its 
strategic position in South-East Asia would add a new dimension to the CFSP 
if the European Union managed to forge close links with this country and 
with other countries in the region, 
1. Urges the European Union, in tbe context of both the CFSP and its policy of 
economic cooperation with the Asian countries, to develop relations with 
Vietnam and rapidly conclude with it the current negotiations for a 
cooperation agreement as an initial stage in relations between the two 
parties; 
2. Calls on the Commission to conclude the above-mentioned agreement as a 
matter of urgency, in view of the lifting of the US embargo against Vietnam 
and the new competition situation which will result therefrom; 
3. Calls for the cooperation agre.ement currently in the process of negotiation 
with Vietnam to make explicit reference to the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and respect for human rights and democratic values; calls, 
therefore, for the European Union to be given real monitoring powers to 
ensure that Vietnam's commitment to such democratic principles is not merely 
an empty gesture; 
4. Calls, as it has recommended on two occasions without any action being taken 
by the Commission, for a delegation to be opened immediately in Vietnam and 
for interparliamentary relations to be established between the European 
Parliament and the Vietnamese National Assembly; 
5. Hopes that Vietnam will back up its programme of economic reform aimed at 
paving the way for a market economy with the necessary political reforms 
which will enable it to join the group of 'market democracies'; calls on the 
European Union and its Member States to support the Vietnamese Government's 
reform programme, laying particular emphasis on the need to make changes in 
the sphere of human rights and civil liberties; 
6, Points out that, in accordance with the guiding principles of the European 
Union, any economic development must be achieved within the framework of 
sustainable development* involving the health protection and social welfare 
of populations, respect for the environment, support for local markets and 
attempts to achieve self-sufficiency in food and energy; 
7. Believes that economic development in Vietnam may have a knock-on effect on 
the economies of its neighbouring countries and that this would make it 
possible to set up a regional sub-grouping (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines) which could 
conceivably act as a counterweight to other dominant powers; 
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8. Calls, therefore, for Vietnam to become a member of ASEAN as soon as 
possible, which would help to create a climate of mutual trust and hence 
strengthen stability in the region; 
9. Expresses its concern at the problems posed by the disputed waters around 
the Paracels and Spratly islands and the Gulf of Siam and calls on the 
parties concerned to make use of negotiation or arbitration rather than 
force as a means of settling these disputes; 
10. Calls on the Council and the Commission to study the various aspects of the 
development of international relations in the Asian region and to report 
back to the European Parliament on ways of developing relations between the 
European Union and South-East Asia; 
11. Calls for the fulfilment of all conditions which would enable the European 
Union to develop relations with all count:ries in the region without 
exception, including Indonesia; 
12. Calls for particular attention to be focused on the development of exchange 
schemes with Vietnam including cultural exchanges, student exchanges, the 
training of managers in market economy techniques, cooperation in scientific 
and technical spheres and the study of the languages of the European Union 
Member States; 
13. Welcomes the initial measures agreed on with European NGOs and urges the 
Vietnamese authorities to promote a climate in which there ·can be free 
dialogue in order to step up exchanges with a view to long-term cooperation 
beneficial to both sides; 
14. Believes that the European Union, in conjunction with the Vietnamese 
authorities, which should draw up suitable legal arrangements to encourage 
foreign investment, must encourage undertakings to develop joint ventures 
in Vietnam in view of· the importance of this market of nearly 70 million 
consumers which could then serve as a bridgehead for supplying other markets 
in South-East Asia, the Indian subcontinent and even China; confirms in this 
context its resolution of 29 October 1993 on the European Community's 
economic relations with Vietnam; 
15. Welcomes in this connection steps taken by Member States of the European 
Union to strengthen their· relations with Vietnam; notes with interest the 
particular efforts being made by France to encourage a normalization of 
Vietnam's position vis-a-vis the IMF; 
16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of the 
European Union, the European Commission and the Vietnamese Government . 
• 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I • YIITNAM; A COUNTRY WITH A LONG HISTQRY 
1. Vietnam, which covers an area of 331 653 km2 and has a population of 
approximately 70 million, is the most heavily populated country in the Indo-
China peninsula. 
2. The country has a long history: a Vietnamese ethno-linguistic group appeared 
for the first time in 200 B.C. in the kingdom of Nam Viet, later to be 
absorbed by China. 
In 939 the country freed itself from Chinese domination. In the thirteenth 
century Vietnam repelled three Mongol invasions, but was reconquered in 1407 
by China, as a result of which a national resistance movement was born, 
which would expel the Chinese in 1428. Under the Le dynasty a Chinese-style 
bureaucratic government was established and Vietnam extended its territory 
southward. In 1757 the country was divided into North and South, only to 
be reunified in 1802 by General Nguyen Anh, who later became Emperor Gia 
Long. 
3. In the second half of the nineteenth century Vietnam was conquered by 
France: from 1883 ~o 1939 it had colony status, from 1939 to 1945, that of 
a French-administered possession. 
In 1945 the Communists and the Nationalists under the leadership of Ho Chi 
Minh declared the country's independence. The ensuing war was to continue 
for seven years, ending on 7 May 1954 with the defeat of the French forces 
at Dien Bien Phu. The agreements signed in Geneva on 21 July 1954 put an 
end to the first Indochina War and led to the division of the country along 
the 17th parallel. 
The guerrilla activities of the North Vietnamese in the South and those of 
the pro-Communist rebels led to the second Indochina War (the Vietnam war), 
in which the United States joined to fight alongside the successive South 
Vietnamese governments. The war lasted from 1955 to 1975; the United States 
withdrew most of its troops from Vietnam after the Paris agreements of 27 
January 1973. In 1975 North Vietnam launched a large-scale offensive 
against the South which led to the unification, on 2 July 1976, of the two 
parts of Vietnam under the name of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
The Vietnam War claimed 1 150 000 dead and 2 600 000 injured on• the 
Vietnamese side (North and South together) and 47 000 dead and 305 000 
injured on the American side. The Vietnam war had strategic consequences 
which still cannot be fully measured: the United States, after its defeat, 
became.wary of becoming involved in any foreign conflict which might turn 
into a guerrilla war. American foreign policy has been influenced by the 
'Vietnam syndrome' ever since. 
4. In 1978 relations with Cambodia and China deteriorated following border 
clashes; thousands of Chinese left the country as a result of the Vietnamese 
Government's policies against them. In 1979 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, 
overthrowing Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime and installing a new government 
in its place. China, which supported Pol Pot, responded by invading 
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northern Vietnam. After a nine-day war,· Vietnam halted the Chinese 
invasion. In the 1980s Vietnam controlled Laos and Cambodia by a military 
presence. In 1989 the troops withdrew from Cambodia, paving the way for the 
Paris agreements. 
II • VIE'l'NM Is DOMISTIC POLICY 
5. At the fourth congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, in December 1976, 
after the return of peace, a struggle took place between the ideologists and 
the military, on the one hand, and the reformers on the other. Although the 
conservatives (Le Duan, Truong Chinh) triumphed initially, the victory of 
the reformers was confirmed at ~he sixth party congress in December 1986 
with the election of Nguyen Van Linh to the post of Secretary General and 
the adoption of a programme of economic reform known as 'Doi moi'. 
6. 
The 1986-1990 five-year plan, which received aid of 8 to 9 billion roubles 
(relations with the USSR of perestroika were still friendly) aimed to meet 
the needs of the population, priority being given to agricultural 
production, consumer goods and exports. 
In May 1987 Nguyen Van Linh, denouncing the corruption of party members and 
the inefficiency of the bureaucracy, met with resistance from the party. 
After the election on 17 June of Pham Hung as Prime Minister of the Republic 
(replacing Pham Van Dong) and Vo Chi Long as President of the Republic (in 
place of Truong Chinh), open conflict broke out between the Secretary 
General of the party and the conservatives, represented by Le Due Tho and 
General Mai Chi Tho, Minister of the Interipr. The conflict revolved around 
the release of political prisoners and a rapid solution to the Cambodian 
problem. The Secretary General's liberal line won the day and on 2 
September 1987, the country's national day, 2 474 political prisoners and 
4 211 common law criminals were released. 
This policy met with resistance from many quarters, however, notably that 
of the military. On 31 December 1987 the National Assembly adopted a law 
on foreign investment, allowing 100% ownership of companies, repatriation 
of profits and tax concessions. On 17 February 1988, on the festival of 
Tet, 3 280 political prisoners and 2 586 common law prisoners were released. 
In February 1988 Nguyen Van Linh developed the theory of 




The eeonomic situation nevertheless deteriorated: galloping inflation and 
a drop in cereal production brought famine in their wake. In October 1988 
the government took steps to counteract rising population figures: vasectomy 
and sterilization were encouraged, families with more than two children were 
penalised. At the end of 1988 the economic situation was disastrous: 700% 
inflation; 6 million unemployed out of a working population of 32 miilion; 
600 000 civil servants had not been paid for several months. Annual per 
capita income stood at $140. The freed9m of the press, which was accused 
of being a threat to 'historical nationalism', was curtailed. 
At the congress of the Communist Party Central Committee (20-26 March 1989) 
a compromise was reached between the conservatives and the reformers. The 
former agreed to the continuation of economic reforms, the latter toned down 
their political demands. The Secretary General of the Party stated that 
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reform consisted in strengthening the Party with a view to establishing a 
'socialist democracy' and not a 'multi-party bourgeois democracy'. It was 
emphasized that only a strong power was capable of leading the country out 
of its state of underdevelopment and avoiding the dangerous course taken by 
the Eastern European countries. 
The Central Committee emphasized the need to check inflation and fight 
famine in the North, to put a stop to subsidies for State enterprises, to 
put high taxes on luxury goods and to reduce tax on industrial equipment. 
7. In late December 1989 the National Assembly, at its second annual session, 
was invited to take on a more important political role. This did not, 
however, entail any relinquishment by the Communist Party of its monopoly 
of power. 
In June 1991 the Party Congress replaced a large number of its leaders (half 
of the Central Committee, plus half the Politburo and almost the whole of 
the secretariat). 
The policy of openness is personified by Vo Van Kiet, whose aim is to 
stabilize Vietnam's economy in order to bring the country out of its present 
cr1s1s. Reintegration of Vietnam into the world economy is essential if 
this is to be achieved. To this end, the Party Congress, held in June 1992, 
adopted a programme of wide-ranging economic reform designed to encourage 
the private sector and foreign investment. However, political reform is not 
on the agenda. 
8. The National Assembly elections held on 19 July 1992 produced a slight shift 
towards greater democracy: there were 395 seats and 601 candidates, 63 of 
whom were non-Communists, 7 members of the clergy and 18% women. Only 100 
members of the previous Assembly stood for re-election. 
Despite this small stirring of 'democracy', very few things actually changed 
on the political scene. Most of the successful candidates were members of 
the Communist Party. However, the higher intellectual level of members was 
one encouraging sign: 50% of Assembly members now have a university degree, 
In September the Assembly elected Le Due Anh as President and Vo Van Kiet 
as Prime Minister. Both of their mandates were in fact renewed. 
9. These small steps towards democracy cannot yet be considered enough. The 
limits of the democratization of the regime were apparent in a recent event 
which the rapporteur made known to the diplomatic representation of Vietnam 
in Brus.sels. In November 1993 the Vietnamese Government opposed the holding 
of a meeting, which had already been organized in detail, of the Vietnamese 
NGOs (including the Movement for Union of the People and the Construction 
of Democracy, which is tolerated by the Vietnamese authorities) and 
representatives of the International Committee for a Free Vietnam, although 
the whole point of the meeting was to promote the development of Vietnam. 
The organizers of the movement have since been put in prison. 
If trade is to develop between the European Union and Vietnam, as the 
Vietnamese Government so ardently wishes, the Vietnamese authorities must 
obviously not just allow, but encourage, human contacts and accept that 
ideas must be freely exchanged. 
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10. Finally, to complete this overview of political life in Vietnam, we must 
mention the First National Conference of the Vi~tnamese Communist Party, 
which has just been held (20-25 January 1994). It confirmed its intention 
of pursuing the policy of 1 Doi moi 1 and affirmed that Marxism-Leninism and 
the thinking of President Ho Chi Minh needed to be reviewed in order to be 
applied to the new situation in an appropriate way. This reflects the 
ideological disarray which re.igns in Vietnamese government circles, with 
economic reforms running counter to Party dogma and threatening the 
legitimacy of the Communist Party. 
Ill. THI ICONQMIC SITUATION IN VIETNAM 
11. The reforms introduced since 1987 have brought about impressive economic 
progress in Vietnam. In 1992 the growth rate reached 8.3% and the level of 
foreign investment topped 6 billion dollars. In 1993 growth should be in 
the region of 7,, or even 7.5%. The Asian Development Bank has in fact 
predicted a growth rate of 8.2% for 1994. 
Since 1991 exports have risen by an average of 20% each year. These 
economic successes have been achieved despite the fact that aid from the 
former Soviet bloc, starting with Russia, has been suspended. It should 
also be noted that Vietnam has become the world 1 s third largest rice 
exporter. The reforms carried out since 14 July 1993 in the area of 
agriculture (renewable 20-year leases for annual crops and 50-year leases 
for long-term crops), together with tax reductions, the right to transfer, 
buy and sell, lease and inherit land for farms of less than 3 ha, should 
benefit Vietnam 1 s 57 million peasants and help to increase agricultural 
production. 
12. It is worth emphasizing that these successes were achieved while the 
country 1 s infrastructures were still in ruins or non-existent. The 
Vietnamese estimate their needs in this respect at $40 billion by the year 
2000, of which at least $20 million must be in foreign capital. Once the 
United States had withdrawn its opposition to intervention by the large 
international credit organizations, Vietnam, having repaid its debt of $13.5 
million to the Asian Development Bank, received $76.5 million from the 
latter to protect Hanoi from floods and develop irrigation of the rice 
fields in the North. In addition, on the basis of a plan supported by 
France, Germany and Japan, Vietnam repaid its arrears of $140 million to the 
IMF, which undertook to provide an initial credit line of 223 million 
dollars. Vietnam also received two loans from the World Bank on 26 October 
1993. The problem now is whether or not the country can absorb these large 
foreign loans, despite its obvious needs. Of the $6.3 million in foreign 
investment pledged between 1988 and August 1993, only about 25% have been 
spent, essentially on exploring for oil. 
The standard of living in Vietnam remains very low. Per capita income is 
estimated at between $220 and $350. Vietnam must therefore devise an 
economic strategy which will enable it to remedy the environmental damage 
from which several areas of the country are suffering, essentially as a 
result of the two wars which have taken place since 1945, and to deal with 
the population explosion, which is particularly acute in the South. In 
order to develop its infrastructure, Vietnam will need foreign capital, but 
it must be careful not to allow its foreign debt, currently estimated at $4 
billion, to become excessively large if it wishes to receive loans from the 
international credit organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. In 
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parallel it must pursue its political reforms and overcome t'he resistance 
which will certainly arise within the machinery of the state to the 
internationalization of the economy and the demands for liberalization by 
the people which will inevitably follow. · 
IV. VIETNAM Is PORIIGN REJ.ATIONS 
13. Vietnam became a member of COMECON during the Cold war, in 1978. In the 
same year a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed with the USSR, 
which provided most of the funding for Vietnam's five-year plan for 1986-
1990. With the collapse of Communism in Europe, the Vietnamese Government 
had to repatriate the dozens o'f Vietnamese students and workers who were in 
the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries. The 
military aid, and then the economic aid, provided by the Soviet Union were 
reduced and this desertion by 'Big Brother' meant that Vietnam had to seek 
and create links with countries in its own part of the world. 
14. The reorientation of Vietnam's foreign policy centred mainly around the 
countries of ASEAN, an organization set up in 1967 to counter the spread of 
Communism in South-East Asia. As soon as he took up office, the Prime 
Minister, Vo Van Kiet, visited Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore, where he 
paved the way for a series of political and economic agreements with each 
of these countries. 
Thailand, for example, lifted its embargo on exports of so-called I strategic 
products' to Vietnam and in 1992 granted it technical assistance to the tune 
of $8.6 million. 
On the political front, all the members of ASEAN - except Brunei - said that 
they would accept Vietnam's application for membership of the 1976 treaty 
of friendship and cooperation, which would give it observer status in the 
organization. In this way Vietnam will be able to take part in the 
political dialogue between the countries of South-East Asia. 
15. Relations with China were normalized in November 1992 with the signing by 
Vietnam of the Paris agreements on Cambodia (October 1991 ) and the 
disappearance of the strategic alliance between Vietnam and the USSR. 
In 1992 agreements were signed between the two countries in the areas of 
shipping, transport and telecommunications. 
Some problems do, however, remain: the· exact definition of the border 
between the two.countries, the dispute over the Spratly islands, over which 
both countries claim territorial sovereignty, and relations with Taiwan, 
where Vietnam is under pressure from China and has to exercise caution. 
The desire for rapprochement between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries must 
be placed in the context of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Following the 
collapse of the USSR, the threat to security in the region comes from 
Beijing and not Hanoi,, and·Vietnamese integration represents an improvement 
in the balance of power in the area vis-a-vis China. For Vietnam, 
integration with ASEAN is a means of sustaining its economic development and 
providing reinforcement in its dialogue with China. 
16. Relations with South Korea and Japan are progressing very rapidly. South 
Korea has granted Vietnam 50 million dollars' worth of aid and loans of $120 
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million with preferential interest rates for the purpose of importing 
industrial equipment. An economic cooperation agreement has been signed 
between the two countries. 
After the lifting of the embargo by Japan in November 1992, investment by 
Japanese firms has risen considerably. Japan also gives Vietnam development 
aid. 
17. Until 3 February 1994, relations with the United States were dominated by 
the country's continuing embargo against Vietnam as a result of uncertainty 
over the fate of American soldiers missing in action in Vietnam during the 
war. After signs of willingness on the part of the Vietnamese authorities 
to cooperate with the United States in looking for missing US soldiers, 
President Clinton took the bull by the horns and decided - despite the 
opposition of Vietnam veterans - to lift the embargo imposed against Vietnam 
19 years ago. This will open the way for the normalization of relations 
between the two countries and enable the United States to develop 
investments in Vietnam, a country undergoing rapid economic expansion. 
18. In November 1990 the European Community and Vietnam established relations. 
In 1992 the Community's financial commitment to Vietnam amounted to ECU 27 . 7 
m. In December 1992 the two parties signed an agreement in the textile 
sector. 
Pending the signing of a cooperation·agreement, the essential ingredient in 
the European Community's activities vis-a-vis Vietnam is the international 
~ programme to reintegrate the boat people. 
This programme has a twofold objective: it has a humanitarian aspect, being 
a programme to achieve economic reintegration of people who had fled their 
country, but it is also a development programme, since one of its objectives 
is the economic development of small local communities. 
At the end of October 1992, the number of those voluntarily repatriated 
exceeded 30 000 (see the SANDBAEK report (A3-0265/93) on the participation 
of the European Community in the international programme for the 
reintegration of Vietnames~ returnees). 
19. Finally, specific mention should be made of France, the former colonial 
power, which played a decisive role in negotiating the peace agreements and 
which is endeavouring to develop'a cooperation policy with Vietnam centred 
upon: 
reconstruction of the country and the restructuring of its economy, 
cultural, scientific and technical cooperation, governed by a framework 
agreement signed in 1977, 
linguistic and educational cooperation. 
The very recent visit by the Mayor of Paris, who was warmly welcomed in 
Hanoi, and that of the French Minister for Industry and Foreign Trade are 
confirmation of the excellent partnership which has begun. 
Of course, this bilateral cooperation is not incompatible with the relations 
between the European Community - now the European Union - and Vietnam. One 
could even say that the historic links between that count:r;y an'd· a Member 
State of the European Union have facilitated the establishment of such 
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relations. The relationship with France is a valuable element in the 
European policy of forging closer economic and cultural links between 
Vietnam and the European Union. 
V. GEO-PQLITIGAL APPRQACH TO RJI·ATIONS BETWEEN THE EQROPEAN UNION AND VIETNAM 
20. Our contemporary world is characterized by the formation of large economic 
(and political) blocs. 
During the Cold War the world had an essentially bi-polar structure, with 
one camp centred around the United States, the other around the USSR. It 
was in this context that the first of the European Communities developed: 
the European Coal and Steel Community, which was to give birth 42 years 
later to the European Union. Its counterpart in the Communist bloc was 
COMECON, which was dissolved after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. At the 
military level NATO was created to meet the Soviet threat and that of 
Russia's allies in the Warsaw Pact, which has also disappeared. NATO is now 
left seeking a raison d'etre. 
21. In the context of the Cold War Vietnam was at the centre of two wars: one 
against France, the colonial power, and the other against the United States, 
which supported South Vietnam in the name of the doctrine of 'containment' 
and the 'domino theory'. 
Vietnam was a kingpin in the Soviet strategy against the United States (and 
later, China). The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 brought in its wake the 
domination of Cambodia and Laos by the Vietnam which was the ally of the 
USSR. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union has left Vietnam isolated 
in the region and one may safely assume that China is not prepared to 
support it in the immediate future. 
The formation of large regional economic blocs is now an inevitable feature 
of international relations; ope need only think of NAFTA, APEC, the EEA, the 
Lome Convention, etc. 
• It is clear, therefore, that the European Union, if it is not careful, is 
liable to find itself restricted to an area including the Scandinavian 
countries, Central and Eastern Europe - perhaps Russia -, the Mediterranean 
and the African countries. However, all the future projections show that 
the great zone of economic development in the twenty-first century will be 
the Pacific rim, from which Europe is at prEsent largely excluded. Already 
this region has the world's highest economic growth rate (6% per annum) and 
t~ade within the area is growing much faster than trade in the rest of the 
world, enabling it to provide the impetus for its own growth. The attempt 
by the United States on the eve of the signing of the GATT agreements to use 
the Asian countries to exert pressure on Europe is a measure of their 
importance. 
Europe, starting with the European Union, must find the partners it needs 
to enable it to benefit from the potential of this area, the population of 
which is almost 2.5 billion. If one includes China, South-East Asia, India 
and Siberia, it is clear that there are enormous needs in the area of 
infrastructure, consumer goods and equipment of all kinds, providing an 
enormous market for Europeans businesses. In addition, an intensification 
of relations between the European Union and Asia would allow the latter to 
free itself, at least partially, from the influence of the United States. 
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22 .. Viet~am could become one such foothold for the European union; there would 
be advantages in such an arrangement for both parties. In this context we 
must welcome the forthcoming signing of a cooperation agreement between the 
European Union and Vietnam as a first stage in their relations. The 
conclusion of such an agreement is all the more urgent in that the United 
States has recently lifted its economic embargo against Vietnam and, in this 
new context, it is important that European firms should not lose out to us 
o~ other companies in such a rapidly developing country. Later, if the 
experience should prove to be rewarding, a partnership agreement should be 
concluded witho~t too much delay. 
VI • THE COQPERATION AGREEMENT WITH YIE'l'NAM 
23. The European Union and Vietnam are negotiating a framework cooperation 
agreement which will regulate their trade relations, inter alia. It will 
be a non-preferential agreement concluded for a period of five years, which 
will be tacitly renewable each year. The agreement will not include a 
financial protocol. Respect for human rights and democratic principles 
should form the basis of cooperation" and be an essential part of the 
agreement. The European Parliament takes the view that a firm line should 
be taken on this point during negotiations. 
The agreement should place emphasis on: 
the growth and development of trade and bilateral investment for the 
mutual benefit of the parties; 
support for Vietnam's sustainable development, with a view inter alia 
to improving the living conditions of the poorest sections of the 
population; 
a dialogue on economic cooperation for the mutual benefit of both 
parties and, in particular, support for Vietnam's efforts to restructure 
its society and economy and move from a State-trading to a market-
economy system which would be open to the world; 
support for environmental protection and sustainable management of 
natural resources; 
stepping up techn~ogical exchanges. 
24. It is important that the agreement should mention the right of return for 
Vietnamese citizens who have fled the country since the end of the war (the 
boat people) without them being penalised in any way. The agreement should 
also mention the importance of cultural relations and exchanges which would 
lay the foundations for a future-partnership between the European Union and 
Vietnam. This is particularly important because European language and 
culture are making very rapid progress in Vietnam, despite the reserved 
attitude of the Americans. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
25. The aim of this report is to bring out the factors which should be borne in 
mind by the authorities of the European Union and of Vietnam before 
developing their relations further. for their mutual benefit. 
Vietnam, which is faced with the need to reconstruct after four decades.of 
war as well as with a significant population increase, has chosen to develop 
its economy on the basis of the principles and mechanisms of the market 
economy. This decision, dictated by purely pragmatic and realistic 
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considerations, should enable Vietnam to become a member of the group of 
Asian powers which also grew, at least initially, out of authoritarian 
regimes. 
Is China not following a similar path at the moment also? The Asian miracle 
should make the Pacific rim into the largest development zorie of the twenty-
first century. 
If it is not to be left behind by these developments, Vietnam is in urgent 
need of foreign investment capital. One should also bear in mind the role 
which could be played by the Vietnamese diaspora. 
For the European Union, this· is an opportunity which must be seized if it 
does not wish to remain turned in on Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa,, 
but instead to play a role throughout the world, as it has done for 
centuries. 
Vietnam and the European Union therefore have a mutual interest in 
developing their relations, and the future framework cooperation agreement 
should be seen as the first step towards a closer partnership which would 
enable both parties to conquer shares of the market in South-East Asia, 
China, India and perhaps even Siberia. 
26. Furthermore, by providing itself with a ~oothold in Vietnam, the European 
Union would give an extra dimension to its common foreign and security 
policy by becoming involved in an area of the world which is currently 
dominated by Japan, China and the United States. There is no doubt that the 
arrival of a new partner would be looked upon favourably by countries which 
might be worried by too great a dependence on the abovementioned countries 
because of historical or ideological memories which are still very vivid. 
27. Vietnam thus has all the attributes needed to become a privileged partner 
of the European Union in an area of rapid development. Nevertheless, this 
cooperation will only assume its full dimensions if Vietnam, in parallel 
with its efforts to introduce a market economy, also introduces the reforms 
needed to ~reate the conditions for political democracy. A market economy 
requires democratization of political life. The European Union and its 
Parliament therefore expect Vietnam to supplement the courageous economic 
reforms undertaken in 1987 with political reforms which would make it a 
trailblazer in the region. Vietnam's culture and history justify this 
ambition; the esteem and friendship felt by the European Union for its 
people will help Vietnam to achieve it . 
• 
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MOTION FOR RESOLUTION BJ-0265/90 
by Mr TSIMAS 
pursuant to former Rule 63/new Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure 
on relations between the European Community and Vietnam 
The European Parliament, 
A. having regard to the political and economic developments in the European 
member states of COMECON, which may influence economic and political 
developments within COMECON's non-European member states, 
B. whereas Vietnam - a non-European member of COMECON - is important for the 
Community both economically· and politically, 
c. whereas the Community has not yet developed economic and trade relations 
with Vietnam, and the Council is against the idea of establishing diplomatic 
relations, · 
1. Calls on the Commission to: 
reappraise political, economic and diplomatic relations with Vietnam, 
which occupies a crucial place in South East Asia, 
put forward proposals aimed at establishing political, economic arid 
trade relations between the European Community and Vietnam, based on the 
principle of mutual cooperation and understanding; 
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